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The "takings" bills now moving through Congress contain a new method
for funding private takings claims brought against the federal government.
Previously, constitutionally-based claims were paid either from a permanently-
appropriated, government-wide 'judgment fund" on an entitlement basis or
from specifically earmarked funds. Under a new "claims-on-agency-
appropriations" approach, statutorily-based takings claims will affect directly
on agencies'personnel funds-even if the agency in question is fulfilling its
legally mandated mission. In the light of possible executive branch
counterresponses, Professor Tiefer examines the separation of powers
implications of this new mechanism with regard to three interests: faithful
execution of the laws, public fiscal control; and compensation of private
claims. He concludes that the courts should let interbranch conflicts triggered
by the new mechanism be resolved by the political processes that operate within
the arena of the fiscal constitution.
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Introduction
A new approach for restraining government agencies has emerged in the
"takings" bill moving through Congress: charging private claims against
agency appropriations. Under current law, the government pays for private
claims made pursuant to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause' out of
government-wide funds specifically intended to pay such claims. In contrast,
the new bill's "Source of Payments" provision would require agencies to
redeem those claims from the limited funds available for their personnel and
2workplace expenditures.
To date, the debate over the takings bill has focused on the expansion
of claims. Yet the new approach of internalizing claims to agencies' personnel
funds has an independent significance. Takings claims would no longer have
a diffuse impact on the fisc as a whole, but would operate with an in terrorem
effect on particular agencies. Performing their mission legally and soundly
would not preserve agencies from such "claims-on-agency-appropriations. "'
By enlarging the scale of claims, the proposed legislation raises the stakes still
further-for wetlands regulation alone, the Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that new claims would reach $10-15 billion.4
Given today's anti-government and anti-regulatory political spirit, the
concept of charging agency appropriations for private claims could take on a
life of its own. Congress might constrain any controversial federal regulatory,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ('[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation .... ").
2. The "Source of Payments" provision specifies that "[any payment made under this
section to an owner . . . shall . . . be made from the annual appropriation of the agency whose
action occasioned the payment .... H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(f), 141 CONG. REC.
H2639 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995). For a description of the bill and its progress, see infra Section
I.A.
3. See infra Section I.C.
4. See infra text accompanying note 128.
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litigating, or law enforcement agency that affects the private sector.5
Enactment of such a claims-on-agency-appropriations approach fortifies the
legislative branch in separation of powers struggles against the executive
branch; rearranges the implementing structure of the Appropriations Clause6
and the power of the purse; reorients the boundary between agency decision-
making and privately-initiated litigation; and reopens the uncertainty
surrounding the judiciary's supervision of public budgets.
Emergence of this new legislative strategy calls for preliminary mapping
of uncharted portions of the "dark continent" or "hidden side" of the fiscal
constitution. 7 Section I examines the takings bill's strategy. It contrasts the
bill's system of charging private claims against agency operating funds with
prior legislated systems for paying constitutional takings from entitlement or
earmarked funds. These earlier mechanisms satisfied the interests of private
claimants, and did not interfere with execution of the laws.
The legal literature on interbranch "purse" struggles, as well as the
author's experience as the Solicitor of the House of Representatives,8 suggest
that the development of a novel strategy by one branch will typically elicit a
counterresponse from the other. Section II explores how the executive branch
will respond so as to blunt the impact of the legislature's new approach and
shift the issue back into the political processes that historically resolve disputes
over Appropriation Clause implementation.
5. For example, newly-created claims might be made payable from the operational
appropriations of regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Food
and Drug Administration; litigating agencies such as the Department of Justice's Civil Rights
Division (for example, where the Division secures compliance with what is subsequently,
statutorily deemed a "reverse discrimination" plan), or Antitrust Division (for example, where
the Division "interferes" with mergers); or law enforcement agencies such as the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (for example, where the Bureau limits the exercise of newly-
legitimated firearms possession rights).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . ").
7. ALLEN SCHICK & ROBERT KEITH, MANUAL ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 115
(Congressional Research Service, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 CRS BUDGET MANUAL] ("hidden side");
Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L.
REv. 593, 643 (1988) ("dark continent") (quoting Oversight on the Impoundment Control Process:
Hearing Before the Task Force on Enforcement, Credit, and Multiyear Budgeting of the House
Comm. on the Budget, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1982) (testimony of Professor Allen Schick)).
8. As Solicitor of the House of Representatives, the author personally represented the
House of Representatives in a number of separation of powers cases with "purse" aspects,
including briefs on the merits and on petitions for certiorari in several Supreme Court cases. See,
e.g., American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (vacating ruling that
limitation in appropriation bill unconstitutional), dismissed on remand, 732 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C.
1990) (failure to state cause of action); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding the Competition in Contracting Act challenged as
unconstitutional by the President), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); see also CHARLES
TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 849-919, 921-1010 (1989) (describing the
budget and appropriations processes).
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The executive response will invoke an important "lump-sum" principle
of appropriations and government contracts law, under which agency heads
enjoy discretion in allotting agency appropriations. If an agency allots only a
limited sum for claims, claimants will ask the courts or Congress to make the
agency reallot more money for their claims. Section II also discusses the
ordinary arguments over legislative interpretation that each side will employ,
and then addresses structural issues of deeper significance. The Article
concludes by discussing the prospects of success for this executive branch
response and the value of understanding this often-overlooked aspect of the
fiscal constitution.
I. The Fiscal Constitution and Claims on Appropriations
A. The Fiscal Constitution and Constitutional Takings
An examination of how the existing legislated system for paying for
constitutional takings fits into the fiscal constitution provides a basis for
analyzing the proposed claims-on-agency-appropriations approach.9 The fiscal
constitution is the legal structure that governs all official activity relating to
spending, borrowing, and taxing. It consists of constitutional provisions such
as the Appropriations Clause, which dictates that "No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,"'0
together with the framework of implementing statutes and internal procedures
within each branch. These latter range from the original 1791 law that
chartered the Treasury Department to the ever-evolving congressional budget
and appropriations processes." A diverse variety of issues concerning the
fiscal constitution has been discussed in recent years. 12
9. For uses of the term "fiscal constitution," see Kenneth Dam, The American Fiscal
Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271 (1977) and Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97
YALE L.J. 1343, 1363-64 (1988). See also Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent
Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 70-74 (1983) (discussing
the constitutional significance of early fiscal statutes).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. For comprehensive overviews of Appropriations Clause
implementation, see WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1994) and Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER
(1975).
11. TIEFER, supra note 8, at 849-919 (budget process) and 921-1010 (appropriations
process).
12. See generally Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456 (1987); Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency
Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360 (1980); Peter Raven-Hansen & William
C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833 (1994);
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103
(1987); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162; Note,
Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1994);
Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, Note, Twisting the President's Arm: The Impoundment Control Act
Vol. 13:501, 1996
The Takings Bill
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. "" Although that
clause appears to mandate that money be spent for any valid constitutional
takings claim, the Appropriations Clause constitutionally precludes money
being spent except if, when, and to the extent that, "Appropriations Made by
Law" say so. As the Supreme Court has noted, even when a federal court finds
a constitutional taking, if the Congress will not appropriate funds for payment,
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury," and federal officials cannot
pay that judgment.14
Accordingly, Congress has established two different legislated systems
to pay constitutional takings claims. The first is somewhat analogous to the
new takings bill; it pays for "inverse condemnations," or constitutional takings
that occur as incidents of non-acquisitive governmental action. An example
would be a peacetime maneuver of the armed forces that mistakenly occupied
and destroyed private facilities. The second system pays for "condemnations,"
or constitutional takings that occur as purposeful acquisitions of property.
For inverse condemnations, the government pays out of the "judgment
fund," as it generally does for tort claims. 5 Until 1956, Congress enacted
appropriations specifically to pay such claims. Under that system, Congress
could decline to make appropriations available to pay claims, although it rarely
used that option.16 Then, in a postwar consolidation of government accounting
and claims-handling systems, Congress provided that a variety of judgments,
including inverse condemnation claims, would receive payment by a legislated
"entitlement" system. Contrary to a simple understanding, the Appropriations
Clause allows "Appropriations made by Law" to extend beyond annual
appropriations to cover legislation establishing long-term or "permanent"
authority for spending. Such "permanent appropriations," or "entitlements,"
as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209 (1990).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962). For an example of the absence
of an enactment pursuant to the Appropriations Clause precluding the finding of a taking, see Hooe
v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 333 (1920); Herbert L. Fenster & Christian Volz, The
Antideficiency Act: Constitutional Control Gone Astray, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 168-73 (1979)
(discussing Hooe and progeny). The courts do give special consideration to particular problems
like attempted congressional withdrawal of appropriations earlier available to satisfy a judgment,
or appropriations constitutionally required for the operation of the courts themselves. See generally
Jonathan Bunge, Congressional Underappropriation for Civil Juries: Responding to the Attack on
a Constitutional Guarantee, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1988); Marc S. Mayerson, Eecutability
of Article 11 Judgments and the Problem of Congressional Discretion: United States v. Board of
Education of Chicago, 35 DEPAUL L. REv. 51 (1985).
15. "Inverse condemnation judgments are generally paid from the judgment appropriation,
except where actions of an agency have, either intentionally or unintentionally, 'forced' the
landowner to sue and the result would be a clear augmentation of the agency's land acquisition
appropriations." 66 Comp. Gen. 157 (1986).
16. Note, 46 HARV. L. REv. 677, 685-86 & n.63 (1933) (citing examples).
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are typically not limited in amount or duration.1 7 For example, Social
Security payments and interest on the National Debt both come from
permanent appropriations."
In 1956, following the model of other entitlements, Congress enacted a
permanent appropriation, the "judgment fund," to pay for judgments on a
variety of claims below a ceiling of $100,000.19 In 1977, it removed the
$100,000 ceiling.2' Satisfaction of these claims is no longer subject to an
annual appropriation, nor does payment reduce the availability of
appropriations for any other purpose, such as agency personnel.21 In other
words, payment of inverse condemnation claims is now mandatory or
"uncontrollable. 
"I
By contrast, Congress funds condemnations through annual
appropriations. Typically, it funds large-scale condemnations, such as the
acquisition of land to expand a national park or forest, through a separate
appropriation dedicated largely or wholly to that kind of object. For example,
Congress will give the Park Service an appropriation to be spent predominantly
on land acquisitions. This appropriation may be general, giving the Park
Service discretion as to which parks to expand, or it may be "earmarked,"
meaning that it specifies particular sums for particular park expansions. Under
either mechanism, Park Service condemnations trigger judicial proceedings to
value the acquired land, and can only proceed to completion when
appropriations are available to pay for the land.' When Congress makes a
17. See Stith, supra note 7, at 607; Stith, supra note 9, at 1378-81.
18. See Stith, supra note 7, at 605 (citing the permanent appropriation for interest on the
national debt, 31 U.S.C. § 3123); id. at 607 &n.91 (citing, inter alia, the permanent appropriation
for social security payments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33).
19. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569 (1962). Original provision for the
judgment fund was codified at 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1958) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)
(1994)).
20. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 12-5 (lst ed. 1982) [hereinafter APPROPRIATIONS PRINCIPLES
1982] (discussing Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Slat. 96 (1977) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1)
(1994))).
21. Congress and the agencies that implement the Appropriations Clause have taken care
to keep the two paths for paying takings claims separate. Claimants can only lap the judgment
fund to pay for judgments "not otherwise provided for." 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (1994). Land
acquisitions are deemed "otherwise provided for" by the system previously described.
APPROPRIATIONS PRINCIPLES 1982, supra note 20, at 12-19.
22. Federal officials pay funds out of Treasury spending accounts when authorized to do
so by different kinds of enactments. From some of the Treasury spending accounts, payment is
authorized by discretionary annual appropriations; from some accounts for "entitlements," payment
does not receive or require discretionary authorization by annual appropriations and is considered,
by contrast, mandatory or "uncontrollable." For the basic distinction, see TIEFER, supra note 8,
at 850-51. Regarding entitlements, see generally A.C. Pritchard, Government Promises and Due
Process: An Economic Analysis of the "New Property", 77 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1991).
23. When Congress makes a specific or earmarked appropriation for acquisition of land
for a specified purpose, and that appropriation is "exhausted," the agency cannot condemn any
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general appropriation for all land acquisition by an agency whose mission
involves considerable acquisition, the agency divides up (or "allots") the
appropriation, thus deciding which lands to acquire within the terms of the
overall spending ceiling. While appropriations limit what the agency can do,
the acquisition funds are separate from or sufficient to cover the agency's
operational personnel and workplace expenses. 4
B. Takings Bill Claims
The Republican majority in the 104th Congress has advanced the claims-
on-agency-appropriations approach as an innovative means to restrain federal
agencies. Although our focus is on this funding strategy, it is worth delineating
at the outset the new statutory private claims funded under such a strategy. In
brief, these claims were developed by a recent "property rights movement,"
which contends that the federal government should provide more compensation
to private property owners for the negative impacts of regulation than the
courts hitherto have required pursuant to the Takings Clause.25 Before finding
a constitutional taking, the Supreme Court has maintained a distinction between
government actions readily found compensable, such as taking title or
physically intruding on property, and mere agency regulation, which is seldom
found compensable. While takings jurisprudence is changing, complex, and
sometimes inconsistent, the courts usually require a property to suffer a near
total loss of economic value before finding a constitutional taking by federal
more land. Thus, when Congress put a ceiling on the prices that could be paid to acquire land
for the National Arboretum, and the jury in a condemnation proceeding found the land condemned
for that purpose to have a higher value than that ceiling, the ComptrollerGeneral declared that
the judgment could not be paid and title to the land could not be taken. 10 Comp. Gen. 418
(1931).
24. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 726 (1993) [hereinafter FY1994
Budget] (Land and Water Conservation Fund).
25. For a description of the component groups of the property rights movement, see
Fighting to Keep U.S. Rules from Devaluing Land, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at Al; Margaret
Kriz, Land Mine, NAT'L J., Oct. 23, 1993, at 2531. For takings arguments by the leading legal
scholar sympathetic to the property rights movement, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993).
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agency regulation.26
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expanded the constitutional rights
of property owners affected by local land use restrictions,27 but has not
matched this with any increase in the rights of property holders affected by
federal regulatory agency action. The Reagan and Bush administrations issued
an Executive Order and a set of Department of Justice guidelines designed to
promote greater agency consideration of regulation's negative impact on
property values.2" These guidelines, however, mostly influenced agency
procedures rather than markedly altering the scope and formula of claims.
Moreover, neither the case law nor the Executive Order could change the
funding mechanism for private claims, leaving intact the existing system of
paying constitutional claims out of funds specifically dedicated for such
purposes. Thus, neither development has restrained federal agencies through
their operating budgets.
In contrast, the 104th Congress' new approach would have a powerful
effect on federal agency regulation. The new takings bills establish a novel
scope and formula for claims, for which the House-passed version, H.R.
925,29 may serve as a model; for all pertinent purposes, the Senate-considered
version, S. 605, tracks the House-passed version.30
26. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992); Penn
Central Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). For an introduction to the
voluminous literature on constitutional takings, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 102ND
CONG., IST SESS., WHEN THE UNITED STATES TAKES PROPERTY: LEGAL PRINCIPLES (1991)
(prepared by Robert Meltz); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings
Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy
of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433
(1993); Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
27. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
28. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. § 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
See Kirsten Engle, Taking Risks: Executive Order 12,630 and Environmental Health and Safety
Regulations, 14 VT. L. REV. 213 (1989); Jerry Jackson & Lyle Albaugh, A Critique of the Takings
Executive Order in the Context of Environmental Regulations, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,463 (Nov. 1988); James McElfish, Jr., The Takings Executive Order: Constitutional
Jurisprudence or Political Philosophy?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Rep.) 10,474 (Nov. 1988).
29. Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG.
REC. H2639 (1995) (enacted). The House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee
on Agriculture held hearings on the bill in February, 1995. Regulatory Takings and Property
Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Regulatory Takings and Property Rights]; Hearings on
Consideration of Private Property Rights Protection and Relevant Legislation Pending Before the
104th Congress: Subcomm. on Resource Conservation, Research and Forestry of the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Judiciary Committee reported the bill that
month. H.R. REP. No. 46, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1995).
30. The Omnibus Property Rights Act, S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), 141 CONG.
REC. S19,250 (1995) (sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole). Two Senate Committees
held hearings on takings bills. Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
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Pursuant to the House takings bill, "[t]he Federal Government shall
compensate an owner of property whose use of any portion of that property
has been limited by an agency action, under a specified regulatory law, that
diminishes the fair market value of that portion by 20 percent or more."3
An "agency action" includes the denial or conditioning of a permit
application. 2 Thus, when a developer's property value diminishes twenty
percent or more because the Army Corps of Engineers has denied or
conditioned a wetlands-filling permit, the developer has a private claim, and
the "Federal Government" shall provide compensation. The House bill limits
its reach to "specified regulatory laws," primarily those covering wetlands and
endangered species protection; the Senate approach applies more broadly.33
Since property owners who suffer inverse condemnation, or
condemnation, already have guaranteed compensation rights and procedures,
the bill's principal beneficiaries are property owners who suffer regulatory
impacts that are not now constitutionally compensable.34 Bill proponents urge
that statutory compensation in such cases will discourage regulatory excess,
treat owners more fairly, and ensure economically efficient property use. They
also analogize regulatory takings to cost externalization: just as private
enterprise should internalize costs imposed on the property of others, agencies
should internalize negative regulatory impacts imposed on private property.35
Environmentalist opponents of the legislation point to the discrepancy
between constitutional and the new "statutory" takings.36 They warn that
providing compensation for relatively small impacts on property value will
deter the government from appropriate regulatory action, license damage to
the environment, and provide owners with a windfall. The bill's opponents
further argue that the social justification of government regulatory action as
well as uncompensated positive impacts on property value, defeat the economic
argument for compensating property holders for regulatory costs.
1st Sess. (Apr. 6 & Oct. 18, 1995), announced in 141 CONG. REC. D495 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995),
D1218 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1995); Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 27 and July 12, 1995), announced in 141 CONG. REC. D
792 (daily ed. June 27, 1995), D842 (daily ed. July 12, 1995). For an editorial reaction to the
Senate Judiciary Committee action, see Congress and the Environment, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1996,
at A14.
31. H.R. 925, § 3(a).
32. Id. § 10(3). The bill defines a use of property as "limited by an agency action" if "a
particular legal right to use that property no longer exists because of that action." Id. § 10(2).
33. H.R. 925, § 10(3); S. 605, § 203(l)-(2).
34. Proponents' arguments can be found throughout the hearings and debates on the bill,
see supra notes 29-30, and in the scholarly literature, see supra note 26.
35. For a comparison between agency functioning and private enterprise functioning made
in support of privatization, see Michal L. Tingle, Privatization and the Reagan Administration:
Ideology and Application, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 229 (1988).
36. The arguments can be found throughout the hearings and debates on the bill just cited,
see supra notes 29-30, and in the scholarly literature, see supra note 26.
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Though fascinating, this takings debate is collateral to whether takings
claims are paid from an agency's operating funds or from customary judgment
funds dedicated to paying claims against the federal government. As its most
innovative feature, H.R. 925 has takings claims met by the "annual
appropriation of the agency whose action occasioned the payment or
judgment." 37 This is a previously untapped source, traditionally stable and
limited in size, that serves to pay primarily for agency personnel and
secondarily for workplace services, such as transportation, field office rent,
communications, utilities, and office equipment and supplies.
The claims-on-agency-appropriations approach consciously and expressly
eschews both current systems for paying constitutional takings claims.3 s
Neither takings bill suggests payment of claims from the judgment fund. On
the contrary, H.R. 925 insists that the obligation of payment be "subject to the
availability of appropriations,"" and when asked about this provision, the
bill's floor manager confirmed that "it is our intention . . not to create an
uncontrollable entitlement . . . .[N]o-I do not believe that the 'judgment
fund' would be an available source of payment as a result of a court order."'°
As this comment indicates, if the new approach were to pay claims on an
entitlement basis from the judgment fund, the elected branches would no longer
control the extent of new spending.4 The claims-on-agency-appropriations
approach consequently retains elected branch control through the separate
processes of appropriations enactment and allotment, thus intimating the shape
of a possible executive branch counterresponse.42
37. H.R. 925, § 6(f). Its Senate counterpart requires "[aiwards of compensation ...
whether by judgment, settlement, or administrative action, [to] be promptly paid out of currently
available appropriations supporting the activities giving rise to the claim for compensation." S.
605, § 204(f).
38. In many other regards, however, bill proponents have eagerly analogized statutory
"takings" claims to Fifth Amendment constitutional "takings." For example, the House committee
report on H.R. 925 compared the new statutory right to compensation with the Federal Circuit's
recent decision holding denial of a wetlands mining permit to be a constitutional taking. See H.R.
REP. No. 46, supra note 29, at 9 (1995) (citing Loveladies v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (permit denial eliminated over 99% of the economically valuable use of the land at
issue)). Such a constitutional taking claim would be paid, as an inverse condemnation, out of the
judgment fund.
39. H.R. 925, § 7.
40. 141 CONG. REc. H2509 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady).
41. See supra note 22.
42. See infra Section II.
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C. Comparing the Claims-on-Agency-Appropriations Approach for Paying
for Statutory Takings with Existing Approaches for Paying for
Constitutional Takings
While the specific effect of the new claims-on-agency-appropriations
strategy on individual agencies has not received extensive legal analysis, its
general nature is no surprise to either opponents or proponents. At House
hearings on H.R. 925, Professor Peter Byrne, an opponent of the bill, testified
that "the absence of any special fund from which to pay compensation under
[the bill] contradicts any claim that its primary goal is compensation ....
[E]ach agency would forfeit the means for carrying out its mission .... "3
An Army Corps of Engineers official with wetlands responsibility similarly
commented: "The payment would come from the agency budget. It's clearly
intended to punish a federal agency for any action that would inconvenience
any property owner to the slightest degree.""
Conversely, proponents defended the bill as a way to persuade agencies
to change their implementation of the law, and thereby keep claims from
cutting into the agency's budget. The direct effect on agency personnel, far
from being denied, was much-touted as a means to change agency behavior.
Indeed, proponents did not publicly discuss the possibility that agencies would
incur claims that would completely exhaust their funds, rather than change
their behavior to avoid such claims. A key bill supporter told the House that
"we see compensation as a stick that forces the government to make the right
decision, not the bureaucratic frivolous decision that can be made with no
compensation."" Both sides thus recognized the significance of the new
system's not merely shifting costs between private property owners and the
government as a whole, but instead impacting directly on the personnel funds
of particular agencies.
Neither side, however, devoted much attention to existing systems for
paying constitutional claims or to the interests they serve. With both sides
focused on the scope and formula of new claims, the impact on the various
interests underlying the fiscal constitution, although recognized, did not receive
systematic analysis. In this context, the fiscal constitution serves and
43. Regulatory Takings and Property Rights, supra note 29 (testimony of Professor Peter
Byrne of Georgetown University Law School).
44. Transcript of Discussion Before the Energy, Environment and Natural Resources
Section of the Federal Bar Association 19 (March 7, 1995) (unpublished) (remarks by Lance Wood
of the Army Corps of Engineers). Mr. Wood disclaimed speaking in any official capacity.
Representative Vento, another bill opponent, after noting that "the cost would be $10 to $15
billion," said, "if your goal is to stop the implementation of these laws, then you do not [need
to] worry about that, because [under the bill] there is not any money. Then you can stop [the
implementation]." 141 CONG. REc. H2547-48 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).
45. 141 CONG. REc. H2540 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields).
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coordinates three distinct interests, each primarily the responsibility of a
different branch of government, and each therefore possessing a distinct
constitutional root: (1) execution of laws by the executive branch under Article
II; (2) public fiscal control by the legislative branch under Article I; and (3)
private compensation, adjudicated by the federal judiciary under Article III.
Analyzing these interests separately serves to sharpen the comparison between
established approaches and the new claims-on-agency-appropriations funding
mechanism .
1. Faithful Execution of the Laws
The execution of laws by the executive branch receives its textual
expression in the Faithful Execution Clause," and follows necessarily from
the structure of the governmental system. Departments and agencies, created
and granted authority in order to execute the law, are given stability and
security in performing their sometimes controversial missions by the
established legislated systems for paying constitutional takings claims. Indeed,
execution depends on Congress providing a legislated system of funding;
departments and agencies cannot execute more law than available
appropriations will fund.47 Without appropriations, federal officials can do
little or nothing; they cannot even receive their own salary. Ultimately, in the
absence of funds, they must be furloughed or terminated.
Through the two current legislated systems for paying constitutional
takings claims, Congress allows agencies to execute their legal responsibilities
without operational instability or insecurity. Whatever private claims are
successfully brought will be funded from the judgment fund or earmarked
appropriations, not the agencies' funds for personnel. These systems
completely insulate agencies from the fiscal impact of constitutional takings
suits. For example, how much funding the Army has for its personnel depends
only on how much Congress votes in its Army personnel appropriations and
on how the Army allots these, not on the nature or extent of private claims."
In contrast, under the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach, an
agency's personnel funds are no longer beyond the reach of takings claims.
The House taking bill's focus on wetlands regulation makes the Corps of
Engineers a proper illustration for this mechanism. For Fiscal Year 1994, the
Corps received an operating appropriation of $101 million for wetlands
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For the clause's history, see Tiefer, supra note 9, at 90.
47. See Devins, supra note 12, at 471-74.
48. In special circumstances, such as contractor claims pursuant to the Contract Disputes
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 601 (1982)), payments




regulation.49 Over two-thirds of that sum goes to personnel compensation,
personnel benefits, and personnel-related charges (e.g., the agency's matching
payments into health and retirement funds) for approximately 1,300
professional and other employees."0 Constitutional takings claims for wetlands
regulation have not come out of such an account.
As reflected in the legislative5" and administrative 2 history of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, agencies typically have some potential to absorb
cuts in workplace services, but thereafter, they have to resort to personnel
furloughs. Through this new approach, therefore, Congress adds a potent new
weapon for shaping executive branch activity to an arsenal that already
includes amending the law, changing the charter of the regulatory agency,
adding an amendment regarding regulatory policy to the agency's
appropriation, or conducting oversight through reports or hearings." It can
even modify how an agency acts by cutting its appropriation, though this tool
is so blunt Congress uses it infrequently. 4
Under the new approach, activities that generate claims deplete agency
operating funds. Not only does this result suggest to the agency that, in some
general sense, it should perform a restrained version of its statutory mission,
but it constitutes a direct threat to agency officials. Sizable reductions in
agency operating funds reduce funds for personnel, thus lessening the
assistance agency employees provide senior agency officials, and ultimately
will threaten officials' own salaries and jobs. Bill proponents, of course, may
believe that agencies have strayed so far from a "proper" role that such an
49. Energy and Water Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-316, tit. 2, 108 Stat. 1710
(1994).
50. The basic budget document for the preceding year estimated FY 1994 personnel at
1,317, personnel compensation at $54,404,000, and benefits at $10,900,000. See FY1994 Budget,
supra note 24, app. at 518.
51. During the 1980s, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act threatened to require agencies
to cut ("sequester 7) their spending by uniform and fairly limited percentages. Pub. L. No. 99-177,
tit. 2, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985). The conference committee report urged personnel not be laid off until
other methods of reducing fiscal obligations had been exhausted, thus recognizing what would
happen-layoffs-once an agency had its general appropriations reduced past a certain point. See
Stith, supra note.7, at 642 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N., 1011-12).
52. The Office of Management and Budget and Congressional Budget Office urged
program managers "not to resort to personnel furloughs until other methods of achieving savings
prove insufficient, such as reducing spending for travel, printing, supplies, and other services."
Id. at 642-43 (quoting OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET & CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
SEQUESTRATION REPORT FOR FY 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1936 (1986)).
53. See Devins, supra note 12, at 460-61.
54. For example, during the Reagan Administration, congressional critics of the Federal
Trade Commission and Legal Services Corporation failed to cut the agencies' appropriations
substantially. Though they had sufficient political support to attach language to their appropriations
precluding the use of funds for specific controversial activities, critics could not force the blunter
step of cutting the agency's general appropriation and thereby triggering personnel furloughs. See
1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 366-67.
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approach is the only means to bring about "true" enforcement of the laws. If
the original intent of statutes like the Clean Water and Endangered Species
Acts involved far smaller negative impacts on private property, then only an
unprecedented scale of incentives, applying personally to agency officials, will
restore faithful execution.
Regardless of proponents' precise intentions, the new strategy reorients
the boundary between government and private power. In the past, private
litigation only affected an agency when courts reversed agency action. So long
as an agency acted legally, private suits could have no effect. Even when
agencies lost, they could thereafter follow the courts' rulings and suffer nothing
more than a change of course. A judicially-enforced requirement to include
cost-benefit analysis in an agency's decision-making, for example, could be
met without operating directly on officials' personal sense of security.
Traditionally, the law blocked private claims directly against agency officials.
The extensive case law regarding official immunity of executive branch
officials recites the discouraging effect on government activity were such
officials not immune from personal suit." Since constitutional claims were
paid out of dedicated funds, their payment did not concern officials personally.
Under the suggested approach, if agency activity produced private
litigation, then an agency would be constrained by more than the desirability
of steering a course the courts would uphold. Agencies would be restrained
by the new approach's in terrorem effect, particularly when the direct impact
on agency personnel funds is coupled with the indiscriminate nature of the
standard for takings-type claims. As with Fifth Amendment claims, the
standard for statutory takings claims depends only on having an impact on
private property, without regard to whether the agency decision is legal and
sound. In other words, an agency could pursue its mission with great attention
to legality and policy soundness, but if its actions were to have impacts of the
specified kinds, it would face private claims, thus threatening its personnel.
Private claimants would thus acquire the power previously blocked by the
doctrine of official immunity, namely the power to deter officials from certain
agency actions by directly affecting their offices and their salaries-regardless
of whether what they do is right.
Like the apocryphal self-protective banker who only lends-to individuals
upon proof they do not need the money, the agency head would only take
action upon assurance that private interests would not respond with claims.
Ironically, the leverage granted by the bill to private individuals claiming a
55. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Similarly, the case lawabout appellate reviewing
courts not intruding into the mental processes of administrators recognizes the distracting effect
of private parties being permitted to cross-examine officials with burdensome tools of discovery.
See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 829-33 (1985).
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statutory taking would be denied to private individuals who experience
constitutional violations, such as a violation of First or Fourth Amendment
rights. When a private party sues successfully on a constitutional tort theory,
her claim is paid from a judgment fund without reducing agency appropriations
and directly affecting agency employees. Agency employees would apparently
be far more strongly deterred from offending property rights protected by the
statute than from violating individual rights assured in the Constitution.
2. Control of the Public Fisc
The Appropriations Clause makes public fiscal control one of the
paramount interests of the fiscal constitution-arguably the single greatest tool
in democratic control of government.5 6 When legislated systems provide for
public fiscal control, they provide a degree of accountability by elected
officials to the public for spending decisions. The public, through its
representatives, must consent to how it will be governed.
Public control acts differently for agency operating accounts and for the
separate accounts that handle large and fluctuating outgoing payments, like
those for procurement, grants, transfer payments to individuals, and claims.
As for agency operating accounts, Congress and the Executive decide these
in an elaborate system, discussed below, that uses lump-sum appropriations,
agency allotments, and multiple channels of political interaction to determine
the particular object of agency funds."
Not paying for inverse condemnations or acquisitive condemnations from
agency personnel funds allows the appropriations process to set an annual level
of agency appropriations that is typically fairly stable. When Congress votes
the same $101 million for the Corps of Engineers each year, it can expect a
particular level of agency operations, such as a particular rate of processing
of permit applications, comparable to previous years. Members of Congress
have the power to vote for a smaller amount and to shift the savings to some
dedicated purpose, but in doing so they take political responsibility for the
consequences of reducing an agency's budget and hence its operations.
56. John McHenry, one of the Framers, said of the clause:
When the Public Money is lodged in its Treasury there can be no regulation more
consistent with the Spirit of Economy and free Government that it shall only be
drawn forth under appropriation by Law and this part of the proposed Constitution
could meet with no opposition as the People who give their Money ought to know
in what manner it is expended.
3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 144 (1911) (quoted
in Sidak, supra note 12, at 1176).
57. See infra Sections H.A, II.C. For example, the elected branches decide through these
processes on the particular objects of Army personnel spending. The public decision-making
interest has been paramount in the context of war powers and foreign affairs. WILLIAM C. BANKS
& PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 181 (1994).
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As for the separate accounts that handle outgoing payments, Congress
and the agencies may, or may not, provide close public fiscal control. The
elected branches can employ discretionary annual appropriations to decide how
much property and which property to condemn. The courts simply determine
the value of condemned property. The elected branches may, however, give
up this close fiscal control by making the object of payment an entitlement.
For inverse condemnations, the judgment fund, like other entitlements,
functions as a blank check beyond congressional or agency control. Congress
has, however, established strong budget procedures checking the enactment
of new entitlements. It was this budget system that identified earlier versions
of the wetlands takings bill as creating a new entitlement of $10-15 billion.
These early drafts were checked pending development of the claims-on-agency-
appropriations approach.58
In contrast, the charging of agency appropriations for such claims
radically alters the politics of controlling agency operations. Until now,
adjustments in agency funding occurred through political processes that
normally implement the Appropriations Clause: enactment of each year's lump-
sum appropriations, allocation, and reprogramming, followed by a similar
cycle the next year. Under the new approach, adjudication of private claims
also affects the amount of funds left for other objects of funding. If claims are
trivial compared to what agency appropriations normally fund, namely
personnel and workplace costs, this effect would not matter.59 Under the new
approach, however, claims might be nontrivial, and, in some cases such as
58. As noted in the H.R. 925 House Judiciary Committee report's dissenting section, "[a]
1992 assessment by the Congressional Budget Office of a related bill, H.R. 1330, which would
have required compensation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for actions affecting wetlands,
estimated these costs at between $10 and $15 billion." H.R. REP. No. 46, supra note 29, at 14
(section of "Dissenting Views" signed by 12 Representatives). The majority portion of the report
offered no conflicting view as to the cost of compensation. There were differences among H.R.
1330, the committee-reported bill, and the bill the House passed, such as the shift in the threshold
percentage of loss needed for a compensable claim from ten percent in the committee-reported
bill to twenty percent in the House-passed bill. Thereafter the Congressional Budget Office did
not make any estimate pertinent to the House-passed bill.
The estimate for H.R. 1330 is so high because of the extent of protected wetlands: in the
lower 48 states, wetlands were estimated in 1988 at approximately 100 million acres, and there
is also extensive acreage in Alaska. A sizeable part of Louisiana is privately-owned wetland subject
to Corps of Engineers permitting requirements pursuant to the Clean Water Act. Such wetlands
often have limited uses if not filled in, but if the government permitted filling, the land could then
be developed and would have the market value of non-wetlands. Thus, Corps of Engineers
regulators may be seen as significantly affecting the market value of the nation's vast privately-held
wetlands acreage. For general background on the wetlands issue, see CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-
SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 78-80 (1994).
59. When the claims are trivial, a claims-on-agency-appropriations approach would have
no more effect than a law that slightly increased personnel or workplace costs, like a new law
imposing training obligations on agencies or making them pay limited amounts to make their




wetlands regulation, enormous. 60
Hence, the locus of decision-making about certain agencies' activity
would shift away from the usual political processes to the private claims
process. An agency trying to keep its funds from absorption by private claims
would view the private claims process as crucial. Like an enterprise with far
more debts than credits, the need to avoid illiquidity would guide its every
move. Presidential and congressional directives on policy would matter
significantly less were private claimants, particularly interests which could
aggregate large claims, 61 to hold the agency's funds in their pocket.62 Given
this threat, the Executive is likely to develop strategies to counter the effects
of the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach.63
3. Availability of Private Compensation
The two existing legislated systems provide full protection, in different
ways, for private claimants' interests pursuant to the Takings Clause. By
making "inverse condemnations" an entitlement, Congress guaranteed private
claimants full and universal payment; and by paying for "condemnations" out
of earmarked spending funds, Congress provided that private claimants would
keep their property unless the appropriation, as divided up by the agency,
satisfied the private claim as valued by the condemnation adjudication.
In contrast, under the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach, while
the bill does give a statutory takings claimant more than he or she has under
current law (which gives him neither a claim nor funding for a claim), the bill
very distinctly does not assure payment. Moreover, the bill does not provide
that lack of payment bars the impact-generating regulatory action from
60. Note in this context that Social Security and Medicare payments, the Interior
Department land acquisition payments, or the Pentagon's weapons procurement payments-none
traditionally funded from personnel accounts-overshadow the salaries of government employees
who process the decisions for those payments. In general, few federal government employees
simply produce services themselves, like medical personnel or teachers, in a way that makes
personnel costs a large proportion of what their operation produces or affects. Rather, since the
agency personnel operate payment, acquisition, or regulatory systems, not production systems for
personal services, personnel costs are usually much smaller in scale than what the agency processes
or affects, while private claims correspond, in some proportion, to what is processed or affected.
61. Although proponents of a claims-on-agency-appropriations approach point to the plight
of smallholders for whom negative regulatory impacts cause hardship, the statute would give power
to those claimants who have large claims or can combine to orchestrate the aggregation of large
claims, thus threatening agency funds. With regard to wetlands, for example, given the regulators'
enormous claims exposure in Louisiana, an association of Louisiana developers able to generate
and recover claims larger than the Corps' personnel funds would have nearly as much capacity
to control the Corps as the creditors committee of a bankrupt private enterprise. See supra note
58.
62. Wetlands regulators, for example, would have to rule out completely policies that might
generate sizable claims, however strongly in furtherance of wetlands law and executive policy.
63. See infra Section II.
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proceeding to completion. Rather, what a private claimant receives will depend
on the availability of appropriations. Since bill proponents could not give the
security of entitlement funding without a politically unpalatable
acknowledgment of increased government spending, they left new claimants
only the right to obtain payment from available appropriations. As Section II
shows, this points to the executive branch's possible counterresponse.
II. Separation of Powers Counterresponse to Claims on Agency
Appropriations
How the executive branch could or would parry the new strategy has
received no analysis in legislative hearings and other discussions of the takings
bill, nor in the scholarly literature. The unarticulated but generally-held
assumption among proponents and opponents alike is that there is nothing the
executive branch can do to prevent claims from being paid out of agencies'
annual appropriations. In other words, when the bill makes the Corps of
Engineers' $101 million in its lump-sum appropriation available to satisfy
payment of claims, it ineluctably makes the whole of that $101 million
available.
The most interesting part of controversies between the elected branches
over the implementation of the Appropriations Clause has often been the
counterresponse that follows a new move by one side. Thus, the Nixon
Administration's assertion of impoundment power, the power to refuse to
spend appropriated funds, prompted an elaborate new Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act.' Similarly, congressional use in the 1980s
of legislative provisions in defense spending bills to affect national security
policy triggered various responses by the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
from sophisticated veto bargaining to narrow interpretation.65 In such
controversies, the fiscal constitution serves as the field for elected branch
maneuvers. Analogously, the most significant aspect of Congress's developing
the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach may be the Executive's response.
Suppose the executive branch uses its regular procedures to prevent the
draining of agency operating funds. Upon the enactment of an appropriation
bill subject to claims, an agency must, as a regular matter, set aside, or
"allot," funds for its various objects. Assume, then, that an agency, either by
itself or with the encouragement or direction of the President through the
Office of Management and Budget, allots only a limited fund for claims
payment-$5 million of its total of $101 million. By allotting the rest of its
appropriation for other objects such as personnel costs, the agency makes that
64. See generally Middlekauff, supra note 12.
65. See TIEFER, supra note 58, at 46-50.
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part unavailable for claims payment.
Would this constitute usurpation of the power of the purse by the
Executive or violation of the new statute's command? Would the courts accept
that a claimant with a valid claim could be frustrated and merely remitted to
Congress for satisfaction? Does the answer come from ordinary legislative
interpretation, or from some deeper analysis? Searching to understand how the
debate proceeds in such a parry and thrust between Congress and the Executive
leads to what the Supreme Court has alluded to as fundamental conceptual
considerations "of peculiar importance . . .under our political and fiscal
system . "...,66 This search requires synthesizing disparate areas of the law,
starting with the "principle of lump-sum discretion" in the law of
appropriations and government contracts, and continuing with issues of
legislative interpretation and separation of powers.
A. "Principle of Lump-Sum Discretion": Executive Branch Authority
Over Allotment of Lump-Sum Appropriations.
When the Appropriations Clause declares that no money shall come from
the Treasury except pursuant to "Appropriations made by Law," it leaves open
the question of who will exercise, and how, the power to decide the specific
objects of spending. As Professor Stith has observed, "[tihe Constitution does
not require any particular degree of specificity in appropriations language."67
During the government's formative years, Jeffersonian philosophy,68 in
contrast to Hamilton's views,69 limited the Executive role. Until well into the
twentieth century, Congress followed the Jeffersonian lead in implementing
the Appropriations Clause by drafting spending bills with numerous expressly
detailed line items specifying the particular objects for which funds were
66. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (1 How.) 272, 291 (1850).
67. Stith, supra note 7, at 609.
68. As President, Jefferson insisted that "it would be prudent to multiply barriers against
their dissipation [of public money] by appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose
susceptible of definition; ... [and by] circumscribing discretionary powers over money." Thomas
Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801), reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 314, 317 (J. Richardson ed., 1897) (emphasis added). In practice,
Jefferson was more flexible. As President, he spent unappropriated funds for munitions in 1807
during a crisis with Britain foreshadowing the War of 1812. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 24 (1974).
69. Alexander Hamilton, who as the powerful and energetic first Secretary of the Treasury
set up the nation's fiscal system, articulated the opposing position: "[N]othing is more wild or
of more inconvenient tendency than to attempt to appropriate 'a specific sum for each specific
purpose, susceptible of definition,' as [Jefferson] preposterously recommends." A. Hamilton,
Lucius Crassus, The Examination No. 11 (Feb. 3, 1802), in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 515 (H. Syrett ed. 1977).
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available.7" In response, agencies would overspend their detailed line items,
"coercing" Congress to appropriate more money to cover the "deficiency" in
their funds, thereby engendering the passage of bills understandably known
as "coercive deficiency appropriations. "71
Those maneuvers shaped today's system. With the expansion of the
federal government in the early and mid-twentieth century, passage of a series
of "framework" statutes for the fiscal constitution, notably, the Budget and
Accounting Control Act of 192172 and the Anti-Deficiency Act, overhauled
the old machinery and ended both detailed line itemization and coercive
deficiency appropriations. These framework statutes created the Executive's
"allotment" power for breaking the lump sum down into the specific objects
for which funds are available. The principle of lump-sum discretion became
the dominant organizing principle for Appropriations Clause implementation.
Congress shifted to enacting far more general line items in the appropriation
bills, each of which would "fund each broadly defined federal program or
activity in one lump sum, termed a budget 'account.'" '74 The President's
annual proposed budget now includes a massive description of the various
accounts, with Treasury identification numbers and object classifications."
Once Congress enacts the lump-sum appropriation for an agency's operations,
the agency head formally allots the lump sum. Each allotment is exclusively
available for a particular object.76 As discussed below, during the fiscal year,
an agency can change its allotments by another power known as
"reprogramming."
It has become increasingly important that the Anti-Deficiency Act
precludes not only obligations in excess of appropriations, but also obligations
in excess of allotments.7" To avoid a situation in which an agency can either
70. Stith, supra note 7, at 609-11; Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 59-63
(1975). See generally L. WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER (1943).
71. Fenster & Volz, supra note 14, at 160-62; Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks,
From Viet Nam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief's Spending Power, 81 IowA L. REv.
79, 110-11 (1995).
72. See Dam, supra note 9, at 272, 278-82; Stith, supra note 9, at 1363.
73. Fenster & Volz, supra note 14, at 162-66; Stith, supra note 9, at 1370-77.
74. Stith, supra note 7, at 611.
75. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED
IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 35-39 (1981) [hereinafter GAO GLOSSARY] (defining
"Appropriation (Expenditure), Receipt, and Fund Accounts"); OMB CIRCULAR A-34,
INSTRUCTIONS ON BUDGET EXECUTION § 23 (rev. ed. Oct. 1994) (giving identification system
that serves in standard forms submitted by all agencies and in President's Budget).
76. Under the General Accounting Office's definition, an "allotment" is "[a]n authorization
by the head (or other authorized employee) of an agency to his/her subordinates to incur
obligations within a specified amount." GAO GLOSSARY, supra note 75, at 33. OMB CIRCULAR
A-34, supra note 75, provides the government-wide guidance on the allotment process.
77. Specifically, the Anti-Deficiency Act requires the head of each executive agency to
"prescribe by regulation a system of administrative control ... designed to ... restrict obligations
or expenditures from each appropriation to the amount of apportionments or reapportionments of
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coerce a deficiency appropriation to cover the excess outflow or be required
to curtail operations, agencies have the power and the duty to allot funds so
as to limit how much of an appropriation can be drained for any object.7"
In 1993, the Supreme Court reinforced and elaborated the "lump-sum
discretion" principle at the heart of this twentieth century system. In Lincoln
v. Vigil, the Court rejected a suit challenging the Indian Health Service's
decision to end the allotment from its lump-sum appropriation of funds for one
particular object, a specific Indian health program. Despite numerous
indications that Congress intended that the agency should continue to spend
the appropriation on that program, the Court held that
[tihe allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another
administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to
agency discretion. After all, the very point of a lump-sum
appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what it sees
as the most effective or desirable way.79
The Court quoted with approval the fuller discussion in a classic 1984 D.C.
Circuit opinion by then-Judge Scalia, UAW v. Donovan, that "[a] lump-sum
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to
distribute the funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it sees
fit. "So
Thus, this lump-sum principle and the power of allotment, with which
the claims-from-agency-appropriations strategy is about to clash, represent a
fundamental doctrine in the law of appropriations and government contracts.
Legally, they constitute the elected branches' system for balancing
centralization against decentralization, overall congressional direction against
administrative discretion. While it would not be unconstitutional for Congress
to resume specifying in individual appropriations how to spend subunits of the
the appropriation . . . ." 31 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1988). A companion provision prohibits "an
expenditure or obligation exceeding . . . the amount permitted by [those] regulations .... " 31
U.S.C. § 1517(a)(2) (1988).
78. The allotment power exists "not only to prevent the need for deficiency or
supplemental appropriations, but to insure that there is no drastic curtailment of the activity for
which the appropriation is made." Gary L. Hopkins & Robert M. Nutt, The Anti-Deficiency Act
(Revised Statutes 3679) and Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis, 80 MiL. L. REv. 51, 73
(1978) (describing apportionment with regard to time, which serves same purposes as allotment
with regard to object). Hopkins and Nutt usefully trace the history of effective compliance with
the Anti-Deficiency Act up to the creation of OMB in the early 1970s and its issuance of the
original Circular A-34 in 1976. Id. at 74.
79. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
80. Id. (quoting United Automobile Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (1984)
(Scalia, J.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985)).
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lump sums and thereby reduce agency discretion, the huge scale of the budget
and the impossibility of directing anything so large on an inflexible basis
effectively requires lump-sum appropriating."1 The trillion-dollar annual
federal budget already contains thousands of lump-sum accounts each
containing on average hundreds of millions of dollars.
In the pertinent example, the appropriation for Corps of Engineers
wetlands regulations consists of one line in an appropriation bill, the annual
Energy and Water Appropriation Authorization for Fiscal Year 1995: "For
expenses necessary for administration of laws pertaining to regulation of
navigable waters and wetlands, $101,000,000, to remain available until
expended." 2 That is all the appropriation bill says before going on to talk
about other funds for other parts of the Corps of Engineers. The bill provides
that $101 million as one lump-sum appropriation, which goes into one
Treasury account for one collection of missions of one agency. All formal
power to decide on finer detail belongs, as a matter of the lump-sum principle
and the law just described, to the allotment power of the Corps of Engineers.
Only those unfamiliar with appropriations law will be surprised that an
otherwise valid statutory claim might go unpaid, even if it matures into a
judgment, when the statute makes the claim subject to the availability of a
general appropriation and no funds are available from that appropriation. The
Appropriations Clause, with its unique negative wording, exerts maximum
force in precluding payment of otherwise valid claims that are subject to the
availability of appropriations. In 1990, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view,
dating back almost a century and a half, that where a claim for money from
the Treasury is made, "the Clause provides an explicit rule of decision ...
. 'However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar
of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously
sanctioned." ' Whether the claim goes through adjudication and becomes a
judgment simply does not matter in this context; all that matters is the
availability or unavailability of appropriated funds.
81. As recently noted, "it would be fanciful today to contemplate line item appropriations
for a $300 billion defense budget." Raven-Havens & Banks, supra note 71, at 99. "Congress
usually appropriates funds in lump sum amounts . . . .The great majority of appropriations
presently used for the procurement of supplies, services, research and development, ships, aircraft
and missiles are general purpose appropriations." JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR.,
FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 35 (2d ed. 1986).
82. Appropriations for Energy and Water Development for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-316, 108 Stat. 1707 (1994).
83. Office of Personnel Management. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1990) (quoting
Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1851)); see PAUL M. BATOR El" AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1340 (2d ed. 1973) (noting that Reeside "held that
mandamus would not lie to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to pay a judgment against the





Accordingly, appropriations and government contract law focus with
rigorous precision on the fund from which a claim is potentially payable. A
fund like an entitlement account or an earmarked appropriation guarantees
payment solely to its particular type of dedicated object, while a fund that is
a general lump-sum appropriation may pay its whole amount to some of its
objects and not be available for others. Government contract law furnishes an
invaluable insight into this unmapped terrain of Appropriation Clause
implementation. The Supreme Court had long held that a contract in excess
of available appropriations was a legal "nullity," and that the government was
therefore under "no legal obligation . . . to meet [the contract's]
obligations. "" Even when the contractor would otherwise have a valid claim,
he cannot improve his position by calling his unsatisfied claim a constitutional
taking, since the claim remains subject to appropriations.85
Federal procurement agencies have consequently developed a type of
standard contract clause that gives contractors notice that their claims cannot
exceed the available agency-set allotment to their objects from a lump-sum
appropriation." In effect, the contractors receive binding notice that the
agency's allotments for objects other than theirs have become unavailable to
them, just as if detailed line itemization for objects other than theirs, the legal
forerunner to the allotment system, had made funds unavailable to them. The
courts firmly uphold the agency's power, by allotment reinforced with notice
through these limitation clauses, to bar payments of otherwise valid claims out
of lump-sum appropriations. 7 This allotment ceiling on the availability of
funds has grown more important in this decade, as technical changes in
government accounting have constrained end-runs around such ceilings."
Claimants with statutory "takings" claims could not take the Corps of
84. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 334 (1920); accord Sutton v. United States,
256 U.S. 575, 579 (1921); see Fenster & Volz, supra note 14, at 168-73.
85. Hooe, 218 U.S. at 335-36; see Fenster & Volz, supra note 14, at 170.
86. These contracts are known as either Limitations of Costs, Limitations of Funds, and
Limitations of Government Obligation. Requirements are given at 48 C.F.R. § 32.704 (1994) and
the text of the clause at 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20 (1994). See generally W. NOEL KEYES,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 247-49 (1990).
87. See, e.g., Law Mathematics and Tech., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 675, 677 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 7, 11 (1992); James W.
McBride, Avoiding Anti-Deficiency Act Violations on Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts ('The Hunt
for Red Ink), ARMY LAW., June 1994, at 3, 16 n.139, 22-23 & n.187. "Nor may such
[appropriated] funds be spent in excess of apportionments or administrative allocations." JOHN
W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 159 (2d ed. 1985)
(citing Anti-Deficiency Act).
88. Congress abolished the "M account," a device hitherto available for merging unspent
defense funds and making them available to pay claims otherwise barred, causing the constraints
by allotment to bite much harder. See Karen L. Manos, The Antideficiency Act Without an M
Account: Reasserting Constitutional Control, 23 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 351-52 (1994); McBride,
supra note 87, at 3-4.
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Engineers' last penny if detailed line items for personnel were separate from
those for claims. Allotment would produce the same situation. The Corps
would say that it cannot pay out its whole lump-sum appropriation, or even
a substantial fraction of it, early in the year to the private claimants that
present themselves at that time. Congress does not write its lump-sum
appropriation for the Corps with the intent that by generously satisfying some
claimants early in the year the Corps can either close up shop or coerce a
deficiency appropriation. Rather, in the modern system, what the lump-sum
principle, the allotment power, and the framework Anti-Deficiency Act require
the agency to do is to allot its lump-sum appropriation at the year's outset and
then respond to any claims in excess of that allotment with the explanation that
available funds are exhausted.
With this background, the analysis can now turn to the particularly
interesting issues posed after an agency announces that its allotment is
exhausted and remits a claimant to Congress, and the claimant instead goes
to court urging his rights pursuant to a claims-against-agency-appropriations
provision.
B. Ordinary Legislative Interpretation
A private claimant with an otherwise valid claim or judgment pursuant
to the takings bill who has been turned away by an agency that has exhausted
its limited allotment to pay such claims, will not always accept the agency's
word as final.89 When a claimant does not wish merely to wait and see if
more funds will come in future years or to lobby Congress to fund claims
sooner, she may turn to the courts. The clash will occur most starkly if she
has obtained a judgment for a statutory "takings" claim and asks the court to
execute the judgment by issuing an order to the defendant agency to take any
steps necessary for funding to become available-including measures such as
making funds available from a personnel allotment out of the same lump-sum
appropriation.
Can claimants obtain a court-directed furlough in a federal agency? When
such a claimant presents the issue to the court, and the agency answers, each
side may argue ordinary issues of legislative interpretation regarding the
meaning of the takings bill with respect to making payments subject to the
availability of appropriations. The claimant may invoke the intent of the takings
bill to protect her property rights, pointing to the express language in the bill
requiring the agency to pay such judgments. In response, the agency may argue
89. The claimant may also seek relief from higher levels of the pertinent department, from
the Department of Justice, or from the General Accounting Office. See Stith, supra note 9, at
1386-92 (discussing general role of courts, GAO, Justice Department, and the executive branch
in enforcing fiscal constitution).
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congressional intent in the enactment of a lump-sum appropriation without any
separate line item or earmark, thereby leaving to the agency the task of
allotting the funds to avoid coercive deficiencies. The claimant argues that
appropriations are "available" unless the whole lump sum is exhausted; the
agency responds that appropriations are "not available" if the pertinent
allotment is exhausted.
Each side will employ some conventional arguments of the kind regularly
considered in courses on legislative interpretation.9" The claimant will pose
the issue as a choice between the text of two enactments-an explicit
substantive law (the takings bill) and a "silent" lump-sum appropriation
provision-and ask the court to read the text91 of the two statutes to find that
the appropriation provision has not "repealed" the takings bill. This approach
favors the claimant, since courts usually will not find that any federal statute,
substantive or otherwise, has been repealed by implication. Courts usually
presume that provisions in appropriation bills, in particular, do not repeal
substantive law,92 though they possess that capability.93 Moreover, courts
least wish to find repeal of a law by a lump-sum provision "silent" about that
law. In the leading case of TVA v. Hill,94 the Supreme Court upheld an
injunction, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, against completion of the
Tellico Dam despite twelve years of Congressional lump-sum appropriations
for the dam; silent appropriations did not repeal substantive laws.
The agency also has some conventional legislative interpretation points.
It is not asking to repeal the takings bill, just to read the bill's subjecting of
claims to the availability of appropriations as consistent with the intent of the
lump-sum appropriation that funds the agency's mission. Thus, the agency
emphasizes that its view reconciles two statutes, takings bill and appropriation,
which is the preferred outcome when two statutes collide. It further argues that
the appropriation came after the enactment of the takings bill, or was passed
by the same Congress, giving weight to the intent of the Congress in passing
the appropriation to fund the agency's mission. It urges that deference is owed
90. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIAL ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 947-50 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
interaction of appropriations statutes and substantive statutes); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE,
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 819-20 (1995) (same); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 679-90 (1993) (same).
91. See generally Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Frank Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power
of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,
50 U. CI. L. REV. 533 (1983); William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 621 (1990).
92. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 221-22 (1980).
93. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1992); United
States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940).
94. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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to how the agency interprets such provisions, a point much in the agency's
favor.9 In addition, the agency may marshal some legislative history,
discussed below, showing Congress' expectations that shortfalls in claims
payment would be resolved politically, not judicially.96
In addition to such arguments, a court using "dynamic interpretivism " 7
might look for appropriate values to infuse into an otherwise technical debate
over conflicting interpretations of texts, legislative history, and interpretative
canons. Environmentalist and property rights amici may enliven the debate.
For example, environmentalists supporting the Corps' refusal to pay a claim
after exhaustion of the allotment might point to the open-ended wording of the
agency's mission statutes-in this example, the wetlands regulation provision
of the Clean Water Act. They might argue that the agency's apparently
conflicting directives-to pay claims and to regulate wetlands from a budget
too limited to sustain both activities-open the door to important
environmentalist public values or policies. On the other hand, the property
rights movement might support the claimant with their own extensive set of
values implicit in the takings bill: individual rights protected by the institution
of property; property as the great tool for economic progress; and the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause as the model for restraining the federal
government by requiring it to pay the claims of private property owners.
Both the ordinary legislative interpretation arguments and the clash of
values over takings are collateral to this Article. For present purposes, the
pertinent issue does not merely involve particular provisions of law or
particular policy disputes, but rather is a separation of powers conflict shaped
by the past interaction of the two elected branches and the internal workings
of each branch-in other words, a "structural"98 context.
C. The Fiscal Constitution and the Separation of Powers Dispute: Three
Interests
In particular, the context of the fiscal constitution means that the courts
should not, and would not, resolve the separation of powers dispute by taking
95. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that if congressional intent is unclear, court should defer to agency's interpretation of
statute, provided it is permissible statutory interpretation).
96. See infra text accompanying note 121.
97. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDIGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1992);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1983); William Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990).
98. The relevance of structural analysis is discussed in Stith, supra note 9, at 1349 &n.25.
See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969);
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the




control of agency budgets. Rather, the courts would remit combatants to the
political process, here, the unique annual political cycle of estimates,
appropriations, allotment, reprogramming, and next year's estimates.
Appreciating why the courts should do this necessitates analysis of structural
considerations rather than ordinary legislative interpretation.
The fundamental Supreme Court decision on the Appropriations Clause,
now 150 years old, emphasized that judicial withholding of an order against
the Treasury followed from the nature of "our political and fiscal system."""
Until deciding Lincoln v. Vigill°° in 1994, the Supreme Court thereafter
interpreted Appropriations Clause implementation as contemplating that
political processes work their will. When then-Judge Scalia discussed the lump-
sum discretion principle in United Automobile Workers v. Donovan, he
returned to those political processes to explain why the agency head's decision
to allot lump-sum appropriations so as not to make them available for the
claimants' preferred objects was "committed to agency discretion. ""' The
nature of the allotment task for the agency head as described by Judge Scalia,
"is an archetypically political task, involving the application of value judgments
and predictions to innumerable alternatives," and therefore not a task with
which the judiciary should interfere.102
Recent significant scholarly analyses of a variety of major "purse"
disputes, connected, like this one, to national controversies with constitutional
roots, reflect the importance of a structural analysis beyond ordinary legislative
interpretation. Since New York v. United States,103 scholarly analyses have
examined the scope for appropriations-based conditions impinging on state
power." Several leading authorities have debated the power of the
provisions at the heart of the Iran-Contra scandal, namely the Boland
Amendments, to annul appropriation bills prohibiting expenditures in support
of the Nicaraguan contras.' l5 Professor Devins analyzed the appropriations
provisions in the background of the great Bob Jones University v. United
States"' decision denying tax exemptions to segregated schools.'0 7 The
abortion controversy has necessitated similar analysis of fifteen years of
appropriations provisions, from the earliest Hyde Amendment, to provisions
99. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1851).
100. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
101. United Automobile Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
102. Id. (quotation omitted).
103. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
104. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 12.
105. See generally Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1989); Sidak, supra note 12.
106. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
107. Devins, supra note 12, at 495-97.
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aimed at "gag rules" for physicians."°s Like those controversies just cited,
the dispute over the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach has the elected
branches in major conflict, with constitutional issues from faithful execution
to constitutional takings lurking in the background.
Accordingly, the dispute over whether to break the lump-sum discretion
principle when faced with a claims-on-agency-appropriations provision calls
for structural consideration of the three interests previously reviewed: (1)
execution of the laws, (2) public fiscal control, and (3) private compensation.
1. Faithful Execution of the Laws
Judicial overriding of agency allotment decisions, forcing furloughs to
pay claims, would both exceed the expected judicial role in execution of the
laws and do so without the usual legislative accountability. Even in
condemnation cases, the judiciary does not have any role so strongly affecting
execution of the laws. For constitutional takings, agencies make the decision
and take the actions that commit the Treasury to payment from a particular
appropriation."°9 The courts cannot, and do not, obligate funds by judgment
via either of the two routes for condemnations.110 The agency decides
whether to obligate the funds, and the court merely values the condemned
land."'
The Lincoln Court held that "[l]ike the decision against instituting
enforcement proceedings ... an agency's allocation of funds from a lump-sum
appropriation requires 'a complicated balancing of a number of factors which
are peculiarly within its expertise.'""' 2 The Court also stated that "the
'agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.'""'
108. See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE
STRONG PRESIDENCY 160 (1992); LOUIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BErWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 187 (3d ed. 1991); Devins, supra note 12, at 466-68, 485-87.
109. GAO GLOSSARY, supra note 75, at 68 ("Obligations incurred"); Manos, supra note
88, at 355-56.
110. "[L]and condemnation can proceed in one of two ways. The government can, under
40 U.S.C. § 258a, file a declaration of taking, in which event title vests immediately in the United
States and the United States becomes irrevocably committed to pay the resulting judgment.
Alternatively, the government can proceed without filing a declaration of taking (sometimes called
a 'complaint only' condemnation), in which event the resulting judgment is merely a determination
of just compensation. It does not obligate the United States and is essentially an offer which the
government can accept (by tendering payment) or reject (by abandoning the proceeding)." 66
Comp. Gen. 157 (1986).
111. "In land condemnation proceedings, the appropriation is obligated when the request
is made [by the acquiring agency] to the Attorney General to institute the proceedings." II OFFICE
OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 7-37 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter APPROPRIATIONS PRINCIPLES (1992)].
112. 508 U.S. at 193 (quoting Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)).
113. Id. (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32).
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Furthermore, the courts would hesitate to take upon themselves the
responsibility for reducing an agency's ability to execute faithfully because of
the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach. Such a ruling would be a fairly
broad assertion of judicial power and would allow Congress to avoid most of
the responsibility for the decision. An agency forced to pay claims with money
allotted for personnel, and subsequently forced to lay off the personnel, might
try to blame Congress publicly, and part of the public would agree. Still,
members of Congress would likely respond they had not intended such layoffs
but merely intended to get the "attention" of agency bureaucrats and force
them to make "hard" choices-or, in other words, avoid actions that would
generate claims. Members of Congress could denounce the agency layoffs
while remaining critical of the agency actions. They would not have to take
responsibility for the layoffs or the resulting agency slowdown or paralysis.
In contrast, the courts can require that Congress itself assume
responsibility for changing or diminishing an agency's ability to execute the
laws by reducing the agency's funds for its mission. As Lincoln v. Vigil noted,
where "an agency's decision [was] to ignore congressional expectations," one
reason the courts forego interfering in the agency decision is the alternative
political remedy, namely, that the agency finds its decision "may expose it to
grave political consequences."14 After all, Congress has an array of
counterresponses to agencies that play the allotment card as their response to
a claims-on-agency-appropriations approach. If Congress desired to act bluntly,
it could simply reduce the next year's annual appropriation. For example,
Congress might provide that the Corps of Engineers' wetlands regulatory
program receive a lump-sum appropriation, not of $101 million, but of $81
million, and create a separate appropriated fund out of the reduced
appropriation dedicated solely for paying claims.
In contrast to what would happen if the courts in a claims-on-agency-
appropriations dispute forced the reallotment of agency funds, if Congress were
to cut an agency appropriation and appropriate the difference for a separate
fund, its members would take full political responsibility for the effect on
execution of the laws. In voting for an earmark, members of Congress would
be accountable for any ill effects of the corresponding reduction in the
remaining portion of the general agency appropriation. If the agency suffered
delay or failure in its mission-for example, if the Corps of Engineers, short
on funds, furloughed employees and delayed its processing of permit
applications-members of Congress would be on record as having specifically
voted to reduce the agency's general appropriation, thereby directly causing
114. Id.
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the problem.115 This public decision-making accountability induces caution
in members of Congress. They vote with the awareness that acting against a
controversial agency by cutting its personnel funds, while initially popular,
could rapidly, and ironically, result in greater delays or a complete breakdown
in agency review and granting of permits, thus tarnishing those members of
Congress who aggravated the problem.
2. Control of the Public Fisc
More subtly, judicial overriding of the agency allotment would frustrate
the second of the interests: public fiscal control. If a court breaks the lump-
sum discretion principle and decides it can order the agency to spend more on
private claims than it has allotted, the locus of decisionmaking shifts from the
political to the judicial process. A court so ruling would ignore just how
elaborately and interactively public decision-making processes function on what
is the common grist for their mills-haggling over who gets how much money
for what spending objects.
Looking again at those political processes, they start with the lengthy
formulation of the President's Budget," 6 with struggles over the request for
each overall lump-sum appropriation for each particular account'' 7 and the
115. Having private claimants tap an agency's general appropriation by court order would
threaten to diminish its ability to accomplish its mission without members of Congress voting
specifically for such a reduction. The floor debate on H.R. 925 did not include proponents
expressly taking responsibility for a reduction in the Corps of Engineers' appropriation for
operations. Proponents of the bill argued that the agencies would modify their behavior, or seek
additional appropriations; neither text nor legislative history shows proponents viewing the statute
as directing furloughs. If personnel defunding does occur, those voting for the bill may well note
that they voted for the agency's appropriation when that appropriation bill came to the floor. Thus,
such members "favored" giving the agency the funds to operate: if the agency instead engendered
and paid private claims, and thereby drained its own appropriation, or a court ordered it to do
so, that was the agencies' fault, not those who voted for its appropriation.
Agency supporters wishing to keep the agency functioning at its past level by appropriating
an increased amount to deal with the pay-out for private claims would face an uphill battle in
Congress. As in any attempt to increase an appropriation, they would face budget procedure
problems, since the budget process currently disfavors appropriation increases. They would also
have the political problems of arguing, in a time of limited resources and budget cuts, for an
increase.
116. See generally AARON WtLDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
(1984).
117. The object identification code in the annual President's budget for the lump sum for
the Corps of Engineers is 96-3126-0-1-301. See FY 1994 BUDGET, supra note 24, app. at 518.
For an explanation of what the digits mean-96 (Corps of Engineers), 3126 ("account number,"
or, more technically, appropriation basic account symbol), 0 (regular appropriation, not a
supplemental), I (a general fund, not a trust fund), and 301 (the functional classification for
Congressional budget purposes)-see ALLEN SCHICK ET AL., MANUAL ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET





schedules for each particular object.11 Congressional consideration of the
appropriation bills then provides a further layer of public decision-making." 9
The takings bill's history reflects a congressional anticipation that legislative
power to make spending decisions either in supplemental current-year
appropriations"' or appropriations in following years"' provides a remedy
for unsatisfied claims.
Even completion of the enactment process for the appropriation, followed
by agency allotment, marks only a temporary break in the interactive political
processes. During the following fiscal year, an agency head faced with an
exhausted allotment may shift unused funds within the account from another
object, using a device called "reprogramming."' 22 Agencies usually follow
a serious process for reprogramming decisions, first making a tentative internal
decision to increase funds for some object, obtaining approvals all the way up
the administrative hierarchy to the cabinet level, then reporting that proposal
to their appropriations subcommittees. 123 An agency head who makes both
allotment and reprogramming decisions that give too little weight to
congressional preference must anticipate that the following year he may suffer
reductions in his appropriation or earmarks precluding his again exercising
discretion. 24 The legislative history of the takings bill recognizes the
118. Pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, OMB and the President supervise
and coordinate that process, before the President approves submission of his budget.
119. In a more delicate interaction, the appropriations committees in their hearings and
reports, the House and Senate floors in their legislative history of the bill consideration, and the
conference committee reports may signal Congressional preferences for different programs and
activities than the agency had intended when it submitted its detailed budget justification for that
overall lump-sum appropriation. See TIEFER, supra note 8, at 946-48 (President's budget and
committee consideration).
120. S. 605 § 204(f) provides that "If insufficient funds are available to the agency in the
fiscal year in which the award becomes final, the agency shall either pay the award from
appropriations available in the next fiscal year or promptly seek additional appropriations for such
purposes."
121. On the House floor, the bill manager explained that "if [the agencies] impose costs
[on property owners], to pay them they must come back to the Congress to seek the appropriation
for that purpose. Ultimately, that decision does come back to the Congress." 141 CONG. REc.
H2532 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).
122. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States, 622 F.2d 539, 542 (Ct.
Cl. 1980); United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 621 F. Supp. 1296, 1374 (N.D. I11. 1985);
FISHER, supra note 67, at 75-98; APPROPRIATIONS PRINCIPLES (1992), supra note 111, at 2-25
to 2-28. For reprogramming and its relation to allotments, see American Elec. Lab. v. United
States, 774 F.2d 1110, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
123. See, e.g., Board of Educ., 621 F. Supp. at 1374 ("[T]he Secretary has a general
policy of requesting committee approval for permission to reprogram .... He made such requests
18 times between 1979 and 1984, and was denied only 5 times . . . .Reprogramming is an
integral part of the administrative process. Congress makes lump-sum appropriations, with non-
binding 'line items,' so that the Executive Branch retains flexibility to tackle unforeseen situations
124. Congress can earmark in the appropriation itself, or in other legislation.
APPROPRIATIONS PRINCIPLES (1992), supra note 111, at 2-42; Louis Fisher, The Authorization-
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significance of the reprogramming process.' 25 Claimants remitted to Congress
may influence these various interactions, much as they always have. 26 All
this maneuvering comes under the heading of proper congressional
counterresponse to agencies playing the allotment card, and has been
anticipated in the bill's legislative history.'12 A court that intervened at the
point of allotment's exhaustion would prematurely terminate these elaborate
mechanisms for public fiscal control.
3. Availability of Private Compensation
As for the third interest, private compensation, it is true that judicial
direction of agency reallotment would help the earliest claimants who receive
additional funding on a first come, first served basis. Even for this private
compensation interest, though, judicial direction would produce mixed
blessings over time, for the claims that got served first would not be the last
claims. The Corps of Engineers' $101 million general appropriation for
wetlands regulation, for example, is dwarfed by the Congressional Budget
Office's estimate of between $10 and $15 billion in potential claims under the
statute. 
2
With Congress not providing more funding nor working out with an
agency what funds to reprogram or categories of claims to defer, courts
wresting responsibility from the elected branches would take upon themselves
Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 CATH. U. L. REv.
51, 65-67 (1979). The takings bill itself does not earmark. It neither sets aside funds for the
purpose of paying claims, nor precludes the use of any funds for purposes other than paying
claims.
125. After stating that funds would come from the agency's annual appropriation, the
House bill notes:
For this purpose the head of the agency concerned may transfer or reprogram any
appropriated funds available to the agency. If insufficient funds exist for the payment
or to satisfy the judgment, it shall be the duty of the head of the agency to seek the
appropriation of such funds for the next fiscal year.
H.R. 925, § 6(f).
126. Even today, claimants seeking private bill relief lobby Congress. Prior to the
enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1947, tort claimants lobbied Congress. Much of the
role of the Court of Claims revolved around claimants lobbying Congress, and Congress either
referring particular claims to the Court of Claims, or establishing classes of jurisdiction for the
Court of Claims to handle on its own.
127. Representative Tauzin from Louisiana, author of the revised House takings bill,
alluded to this process:
In fact, the legislation specifically says that the agency must provide money out
of its own appropriated funds for the payment of these claims and give the agency
the right to reprogram money within its budget to do that. If it does not do that,
Congress, of course, has the authority to make sure it does the next time it visits
this Congress.
141 CONG. REc. H2566 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).
128. See supra note 58.
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the problems implicit in private compensation provisions that, unlike the
system for constitutional takings, do not provide access to the judgment fund.
Under the bill, compensation is made available once negative regulatory
impacts exceed a certain threshold, without discrimination between legal and
illegal or sound and unsound agency decisions. Though they can expand the
allotment for claims from limited appropriated funds, courts generally cannot
fund all the claims, sort out categories of claims, nor prevent new claims being
generated faster than old ones are settled.' 29
Conversely, when the courts adhere to the lump-sum discretion principle,
they leave Congress a way to serve the private compensation interest should
it so determine. Congress can confer entitlement status on statutory takings
claims, 3 ° as it has done with constitutional takings. In fact, however,
Congress chose not to take this path so as to shelter the takings bill from
political and procedural barriers disfavoring the creation of new
entitlements. '
In sum, only political processes can successfully manage the implications
of the claims-on-agency-appropriations approach for the three interests
identified here-even that of satisfying private claims. Any court with
129. As shown in City of Los Angeles v. Adams, prioritizing claims against limited
appropriated funds is a daunting task, best handled in the first instance by the agency in question,
even if the court takes a supervisory role because of entitlement-type statute. 556 F.2d 40, 49-50
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
130. As Judge Scalia wrote: "An agency may, of course, be constrained to expend a
certain portion of a lump-sum appropriation on a particular program because that program
establishes a system of statutory entitlements over which the agency has no control." United
Automobile Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 825 (1985).
131. When the CBO scored H.R. 925, it emphasized the statutory language making agency
appropriations the source for any spending, and thus concluded that the bill did not provide for
any direct spending at all:
Based on our analysis of the language of the bill and the legal practice governing
payments for takings of private property, CBO estimates that enactment of the bill
would not affect direct spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures
would not apply. We have not yet completed our analysis of the costs of this
legislation, which.., would depend on the appropriation of the necessary amounts.
H.R. REP. No. 46, supra note 29, at 8. Although it might seem ironic that a bill estimated to
produce claims of $10-$15 billion, see supra note 58, "would not affect direct spending," the
distinction is the essential difference between a bill under which payment of claims is an
entitlement, and a bill under which payment of claims is subject to appropriations.
A network of budget points of order, budget process political barriers, cautionary budget
estimation procedures, and antipathetic political attitudes make it harder to enact new entitlements.
Both chambers would subject such a bill to numerous budget-related points of order both for
creating a new entitlement, which requires an elaborate budget process, and for creating new direct
spending without an allocation from the annual budget. The budget committees would denounce
creation of the new entitlement as destructive of the budget process in general and the budget for
that year in particular. Individual members would rail against the bill as a budget-buster. In light
of the anti-entitlement budget climate prevalent in the past decade, it is hardly surprising that
proponents of the new strategy deliberately decided not to make private claims a new entitlement.
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structural considerations in mind will steer the dispute into the appropriately
political channels established for Appropriations Clause implementation
disputes.
Conclusion
While "our political and fiscal system" has evolved considerably since
1851, when the Supreme Court used that term to describe the implementation
of the Appropriations Clause, now, as then, the system serves the basic task
of coordinating the operations of government. It does so not via escape from
the political processes into the courts, but through the interaction of Congress
and the Executive as they shape appropriation enactment, allotment,
reprogramming, and subsequent cycles of appropriation enactment. For too
long, the implementation side of the Appropriations Clause has been seen as
mysterious. In reality, the modern system of federal funding focuses and
resolves separation of powers issues through political innovation, maneuver,
and compromise. Exploration of these processes reflects some of the
extraordinary workings of our fiscal constitution.
While the novel claims-on-agency-appropriations approach is very
attractive to Congress, it may elicit a response from the Executive employing
the allotment power to remit unsatisfied claimants back to the legislature. If
Congress can threaten agencies with claims exhausting their operating funds,
agencies can respond by trying to shift the responsibility for choices among
competing uses of scarce agency funds back to Congress. Congress can
respond further by threatening earmarks or entitlement language that would
take away agency discretion, and each side can await a judicial resolution. For
their part, courts could choose a legislative interpretation on ordinary grounds.
Mindful of structural considerations, however, they are best advised to use the
lump-sum discretion principle to send the dispute back to the political arena.
In the long run, however the disputed claim demands of the late twentieth
century are settled, their resolution will create a new system just as surely as
the coercive deficiencies of the early twentieth century gave rise to the current
system. The fiscal constitution never fully tames the innovations and maneuvers
of a particular era. Rather, it refashions itself from each struggle for the next
stage in its evolution.
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